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A rainbow table is an optimization for inverting hash functions: finding the password when all you have is its hash. Although this is not strictly necessary here, I recommend reading which has a very good explanation that clears a few common misconceptions. There are two parts to RAR encryption (or just about anything that uses a password to encrypt some data). First, an encryption key is derived from the password, using a (KDF). Then the encryption key is used to encrypt or decrypt the data.

Even if the KDF is a hash function, a rainbow table wouldn't help: the attacker does not have the output of the KDF. When a password is used for authentication, the output of the KDF is what's stored in the database. When a password is used for encryption, the output of the KDF is the secret key which is what the attacker is after.

In any case,. WinRAR which includes a salt. A KDF transforms a variable-length string into a fixed-size key. A key property of a KDF is that it must distinct map input strings to distinct keys. A (SHA-1, SHA-256, ) achieves this.

When the input string is a human-provided password, there are two other important properties which a hash function does not achieve on its own:. If two people choose the same password, they must not end up having the same key. The KDF must be slow to compute, so that an attacker cannot find the password by brute force. A salt achieves the first property.

The second property is achieved by doing something like this: take the password, append the salt, hash the lot; take this hash, append the salt, hash the lot; repeat many times. A rainbow table is an optimization to compute preimages through “one-way” functions: functions that are easy to compute in one direction but nigh-impossible to inverse, i.e. Given x it is easy to compute y=f(x) but given y there is no known method to find x such that y=f(x) other than somehow guessing x and checking. Hash functions are like this. Encryption with a symmetric key is not like this: the attacker cannot compute f any more than he can compute its inverse.

Hence rainbow tables cannot help with breaking symmetric encryption. Rainbow tables are used to decode Hashes, not encryption.

A rainbow table is just a list of precomputed hashes for some set of possible input. So if you pre-compute the hash for every possible windows password, when you want to recover an unknown password, all you need is the hash from the SAM database and then look it up in the rainbow table. The rainbow table then gives you a password which will correspond to that hash.

This is complicated by password salt, but that's the basic idea. Rainbow tables don't help with breaking encryption. Theoretically you could pre-compute all possible cypher-text for all possible keys and all possible plain-text input, but you'd probably require more bits to store this data than there are atoms in the universe, not to mention that those atoms would probably have boiled away to nothing before you get there. It would be quicker (albeit still prohibitively slow) just to brute-force the key. A rainbow table doesn't take a fixed amount of storage - it's a space/time tradeoff.

Only one point in each chain is stored - that's kind of the point, and what differentiates rainbow tables from exhaustive dictionaries. But yes, it's still infeasible against a key with 128 bits of entropy - so keys generated from random sources are safe.

Keys that are derived from passwords/passphrases can still be susceptible, and that's what I was referring to - RAR encryption is based on a password. Salts are equally applicable for password-based encryption, for much the same reason. – Oct 2 '10 at 6:39. Andre: Salts don't make hashes harder to crack at all. Since the salt is stored in plaintext right next to the hash, it's easy to just take that part out of the cracked hash. The purpose of a salt is to make sure that identical plaintexts still have different hashes. For example, say your password is entropy9 and its hash is 649acba24bab481f16ee49cdf0a40870.

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Now if you see someone else's hash is also 649acba24bab481f16ee49cdf0a40870, then you know their password immediately! Obviously this has implications in non-security contexts too, like with hashmaps etc. You two have a fundamental misunderstanding of the issue. For example, md5 has been completely mapped - there are widely public tables that can instantly tell you a source plaintext given a hash. Is a salt going to help you? Say your password was 'hunter2' and the salt is 'xAoE'. Then when you look up the hash, you will get 'hunter2xAoE' and can trivially separate the salt from the rest of the hash.

Think about it, adding extra text to the hashed text obviously can't expand the hash space. Its only use is to obscure things when multiple users have the same password. – Oct 25 '10 at 21:31. This is completely wrong. MD5 has not been completely mapped: assuming that by mapping you mean finding an inverse for each hash, that would take about 2^128.16 bytes of storage (5 billion billion billion terabytes).

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You can't “take out that part of the cracked hash”: cryptographic hashes are designed so that knowing the hash(password+salt) does not give you any advantage in finding the hash(password). Tables of MD5 and the like contain human-readable passwords, say 10^15 of them with a rainbow table.

If you add a 64-bit salt (on the low side), the size of the table is multiplied by 10^18. – Aug 8 '12 at 17:50.